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Abstract 
 
The idea of democracy is being championed across the world, with some fifty 
new countries embracing this type of political system between 1974 and 2011 
(Freedom House, 2016). Simultaneously, however, dissatisfaction has grown due 
to the perceived incapacity of democracy to deal with collective problems, hence 
the necessity to reconfigure it and redraw some of its principles. This paper links 
the analysis of the recent evolution of democratic systems with the trajectory of 
socio-political conflicts and the changing features of contemporary terrorism. It 
examines, therefore, two intertwined phenomena, namely the radicalization of 
democracy and the radicalization of the other. It concludes by stressing that 
encouraging dissent and heeding contentious claims made by social movements 
may be one way of mitigating both types of radicalization. Embedded in the 
tradition of critical criminology, this paper attempts to demonstrate that only by 
outflanking conventional categories of analysis can the criminological 
community aspire to grasp such thorny contemporary phenomena.  
 
Introduction 
 
Among individuals and groups there are relational dynamics which favour the 
establishment of restraint and encourage cooperative interaction. Such dynamics 
prevail in highly cohesive societies. However, relational dynamics may produce 
harmony or conflict, and in some cases lead to violent hostility in the form or 
organized political violence. The current international situation is characterized 
by a high degree of hostility, and the political violence we witness can be 
examined as action which influences, and is influenced by, the responses it 
receives. A form of ‘joint action’, the violence expressed by radicalized groups, 
regarded as a threat to democracy, cannot be broken down into the separate acts 
comprising it, namely the violence meted out by democracy.  
   Democracies are successful in defusing political violence when they produce 
individuals and groups capable of acting as the whole community of which they 
are a part (Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1998). By contrast, they are unsuccessful when 
they inspire individuals and groups to pursue completely different social orders. 
This is when two forms of radicalization may start confronting each other, 
respectively engaged in forcefully (and often illegitimately) imposing their 
systems of values and practices. ‘Off-shore’ democracies, discussed below, are 
major participants in this confrontation and seem to be shaped by a crisis of 
hegemony leading them to suspend the rules to which they, nevertheless, claim 
loyalty. Religious extremism expressed by Islam, a specific form of radicalization 
also addressed in this paper, is the other participant, and expresses itself 
through what will be termed mimetic violence. A social force that could temper 
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destructive confrontation emanates from social movements, whose 
revitalization, given their aversion to the violence exercised by both state and 
non-state agents, is necessary. The analysis below should be located in the wide 
realm of critical criminology, whose sensibility and analytical categories 
transcend conventional tools commonly employed when addressing law and 
order. 
   In the following section a depiction is attempted of the features characterizing 
off-shore democracies. 
    
Off-shore democracies 
 
Secrecy characterizes many operations conducted by contemporary global elites, 
in the economic as well as in the political realm (Urry, 2014). The term ‘off-
shore’, applied to the range of financial irregularities that allow the hiding of 
wealth (Ruggiero, 2017), can also describe contemporary mechanisms of 
democratic decision-making and practices, which in turn are increasingly 
‘hidden’ from public scrutiny. Let us delineate the process leading to the 
establishment of off-shore democracies. 
   Empirical theories of democracy tend to focus on existing models, so that they 
end up endorsing the status quo as the most preferable arrangement. Inspired by 
a sense of ‘realism’, such theories jettison suggestions of improvement, let alone 
of alternative models, treating them as idealistic, empirically inadequate or 
‘unreal’ (Held, 2006). However, the performance of ‘real’ democratic systems 
cannot be dissociated from the evaluation expressed by those who experience 
the functioning of such systems. Civil society, for instance, may not limit its 
action to the periodical expression of voting preferences, but is likely to put 
forward demands and, in so doing, exercise a form of surveillance or vigilance 
over institutional decisions. A public sphere distinct from the state apparatus, in 
other words, constitutes a key component of what we ought to understand for 
democracy. Democratic decision making, in brief, can be accomplished through 
political action from below. 
 
‘In the historical evolution of democratic regimes, a circuit of surveillance, 
anchored outside state institutions, has developed side by side with the 
institutions of electoral accountability… democracy develops with the 
permanent contestation of power’ (Della Porta, 2013: 5). 
 
Non-state aggregations, including independent media and professionals, 
pressure groups, non-governmental organizations and social movements have 
traditionally played such a surveillance function. The latter, in particular, as 
relevant actors and purveyors of collective needs and sentiments, express 
implicit judgments on elites and their activity. What distinguishes democratic 
systems is their specific capacity to respond to such judgments or, to put it 
differently, their ability to deal with contentious politics.  
   Not all politics is contentious, as it commonly consists of elections, 
consultation, ceremony and bureaucratic process (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 
2001). Social movements, instead, do express contentious politics when they 
make ‘contained’ and/or ‘transgressive’ claims, namely when demands are put 
forward through well-established means and/or through innovative means. 
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Ultimately, democracy distinguishes itself from other regimes in that its elected 
political agents should be able to interact with challengers, with new political 
entities and their innovative collective action (Tilly, 2004; 2007). Democracies, 
in brief, can be classified on the basis of the elasticity of their structures and the 
degree to which they encourage political processes and social dynamism leading 
to change (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). 
    This classification was proposed by some among the very founders of classical 
political thought, with Machiavelli (1970), for instance, identifying as corrupt 
those systems which proved unable to deal with tumults and other forms of 
troubling dissent. Contention, including violent contention, Machiavelli argued, 
causes no harm, particularly when the elite, through changes in social 
arrangements and legislation, defeats the corrupt elements within itself. Livy’s 
history suggests that the absence of corruption was the reason why the 
numerous tumults that took place in Rome ‘did no harm, but, on the contrary, 
were an advantage to that republic’ (Bull, 2016: 35).  
    Democracies can claim that they are concerned with the pursuit of harmony 
and public wellbeing, but as Dewey (1954) argued, they can hardly claim that 
their acts are always socially beneficial. For instance, one the most regular 
activities of democracies is waging war. 
 
‘Even the most bellicose of militarists will hardly contend that all wars 
have been socially helpful, or deny that some have been so destructive of 
social values that it would have been infinitely better if they had not been 
waged’ (ibid: 14). 
 
Democratic political acts, therefore, may be presented as socially beneficial, even 
when their anti-social nature prevails.  This is why citizens, Dewey warned, 
should be cautious in identifying their community and its interests with 
politically organized institutions and theirs. While launching this warning, 
Dewey approached an embryonic notion of social movement, stressing that the 
recognition of the harm caused by states on behalf of the public leads the public 
itself to institute its own sphere of action with the purpose of conserving and 
expanding its interests. Democracies striving to achieve unity, on the other hand, 
may do so only by imposing intellectual uniformity and ‘a standardization 
favourable to mediocrity’ (ibid: 115).  They tend to regiment opinions and 
respond to difference with astonishment or punishment: mass production is not 
confined to the factory but covers ideas, an argument that led Dewey to identify a 
process of ‘eclipse of the public’. While the political candidate, with ‘his firm jaw 
and his lovely wife and children’ (ibid), prepares to make decisions, he also 
breeds indifference if not contempt. We are faced, here, with a crisis of politics as 
seen around a century ago, when he public grew apathetic, bewildered, barred 
from expressing its opinion or dissent. 
   In brief, off-shore democracies are unable to deal with political contention, to 
interact with challengers, to accept contestation, and to submit choices to 
collective assessment and deliberation. They testify to a crisis of politics that 
pushes them in the direction of increasing secrecy. Crucial decisions affecting all 
are made in closed enclaves impervious to popular control. 
 
Intolerance and political de-skilling 
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Intolerance towards dissent constitutes one of the major manifestations of 
today’s crisis of politics, which hampers the possibility of collective action, 
denies space for negotiation between rulers and ruled, and ultimately prevents 
human communities from representing themselves as agents of their own 
history (Balibar, 2016). In this sense, the very notion of citizenship is ‘under 
siege and reduced to impotence’, while democratic systems take on a ‘pure’ form, 
namely they become capable of dealing exclusively with their own logic and the 
mechanisms of their own reproduction (ibid: 12). Individuals and groups, as a 
consequence, are expelled from their place in the world (Sassen, 2014). 
   While reducing the opportunities for participatory forms of action, 
contemporary democracies simultaneously expand the sphere of delegation. 
Thus, the electoral process becomes increasingly influenced by private interests 
expressed through the initiative of donors and lobbyists. Soliciting bribes is now 
termed ‘fundraising’ and bribery itself ‘lobbying’, while bank lobbyists ‘shape or 
even write the legislation that is supposed to regulate their banks’ (Graeber, 
2013: 114). 
   While participation is discouraged, enclaves of political and economic power 
become increasingly unreceptive to the moods and needs of citizens. These 
enclaves constitute forms of ‘off-shore democracies’, in the sense that the 
dynamics of their action, the procedures of their decision-making and their very 
capacity to make decisions affecting all are hidden from the electorate. This leads 
to a process of political de-skilling of the electorate, who grows impotent, 
disillusioned and, again, apathetic.  
    Lack of participation marks the simultaneous decline of deliberative practices, 
namely those processes leading to the formation of opinions in interaction with 
others. These practices characterize social movements and the way in which 
their horizontal communication produces tolerance for the other and acceptance 
of diversity. The shift in institutional responses to social movements, looking at 
purely technical factors, proves how this communicative process is being 
hampered. Protest raises military responses, aided by crowd-control techniques 
such as ‘kettling’ or ‘coralling’. The former is a metaphor likening the 
containment of protesters to the containment of heat and steam within a kettle, 
and consists in the encircling of demonstrators and their subjugation through 
forced immobility. To avoid allusions to military confrontation, however, the 
latter term is used, which refers to the practice of enclosing animals and 
restricting the territory they occupy. Demonstrators so ‘kettled’ or ‘coralled’, 
being denied access to food, water and toilet facilities, are unlikely to fight and 
defy batons or electrified ‘battle-prods’. Often, growing tired after hours of being 
surrounded, they may just ask to go home. In some cases, the ‘kettling’ takes 
place well before the agreed location is even reached by protesters, who are 
locked at bus or train stations and physically prevented from joining the 
demonstration. Regarded as a violation of human rights, this technique and its 
military corollary increase the cost of protest, eliciting feelings of injustice and, 
therefore, at times strengthening the willingness to participate.  
    Certainly, the militarization of crowd control is perhaps a constant feature of 
democracies, which have often found it particularly hard to recognize the right to 
demonstrate and to negotiate with demonstrators. This feature, however, has 
gained novel prominence with the transformation of public into private space, 
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whereby demonstrators are seen as perturbers of the smooth running of 
business, enemies of consumers and deniers of their ‘human right’ to shop. Idle 
demonstrators had better evacuate private spaces, because they do not count, 
they are neither consumers nor labour force. The philosophy behind this shift is 
found in the paradoxical idea that, in countries where dissent is permitted, there 
is no need to dissent: on the contrary, it is in countries where opposition is 
banned that protest is justified. Hence the disingenuous claim that regime 
change, carried out through the invasion of undemocratic countries, is aimed at  
providing their inhabitants with the right to protest.  
   Off-shore forms of government, militarization and massive presence of police 
officers, transforming public spaces into war zones, are signs of the 
radicalization of democracy, a process also taking place at the international level. 
 
In the name of freedom  
 
‘Anxious Dictators and Wavering Democracies’ was the title of a recent report 
published by Freedom House (2016). In the report, the US and Europe were 
described as struggling to cope with international events, particularly 
unresolved regional conflicts. Their role in exacerbating such conflicts was not 
explicitly mentioned, although both their action and inaction were said to have  
‘generated unprecedented numbers of refugees and incubated terrorist groups 
that inspired or organized attacks on targets aboard’ (ibid: 1). ‘Wavering 
democracies’ were accused of responding to such issues through the 
development of populist campaigns and the adoption of security measures that 
run counter the core values of free societies. Displaying lack of self-confidence, 
democracies were said to fuel xenophobic feelings, creating a climate in which 
attacks of facilities hosting refugees, the erection of fences and the creation of 
draconian laws become legitimized.  
 
‘In effect, the European establishment’s inability to manage these new 
challenges – on top of the lingering economic woes that began nearly a 
decade ago – gave fresh impetus to those who have questioned the 
European project and the liberal, universal values that it represents’ (ibid: 
2). 
 
   Intolerant policies were implemented in the name of patriotism and the 
draconian measures adopted against the ‘intruders’ were echoed by violent 
strategies of law enforcement and crowd control against all dissenters.  
   The radicalization of democracy at the international level also entails the 
formation of a planetary oligarchy and the concentration of the world resources, 
along with the promotion of values and principles justifying them. The word 
freedom, for instance, has been appropriated by those who deny it to the other, 
namely right-wing, xenophobic parties springing across Europe, so that a 
concept purportedly belonging to the democratic tradition is being used to 
destroy that tradition.  
   Recent invasions, illegal wars, torture, kidnappings, the use of prohibited 
weapons and the killing of civilians have been perpetrated in the name of this 
type of freedom. Similarly, the mercenary-state partnerships and their 
destructive activities have been justified through the benefit they are bound to 
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produce for the establishment of global liberty. With drones and homicide 
missions, democracies can assassinate people on the secret orders of heads of 
state, and ‘for a highly targeted death (say, a gang chief) there are on average 
nine collateral victims’ (Badiou, 2016: 60). More than collateral damage, these 
assassinations amount to deterrence addressed to entire populations. 
    The radicalization of democracy is a response to a crisis of hegemony, when 
rules are suspended or eliminated and open ‘wars of manoeuvre’ are waged 
against internal and external enemies (Jessop, 2016). The process triggers the 
creation of ‘deep states’, namely hidden auxiliary power networks that 
supplement the ‘off-shore’ democratic entities mentioned above. Democracy, in 
this way, arms itself with the very forces that threaten it (Todorov, 2014). 
Openness, moderation and temperance are replaced by excess, hubris and 
feelings of omnipotence, while freedom and free enterprise intertwine with 
military missions which, rather than engaging in the arduous task of establishing 
states, simply destroy states (Badiou, 2016). The enjoyment of rights is 
polarized, setting freedom of enterprise against freedom to remedy 
entrepreneurial social harm, freedom to establish political agendas against 
freedom to oppose them, freedom to engage in war against freedom to 
demonstrate against it.  
   The radicalization of democracy takes on the nature of an auto-immune 
disorder that threatens the life of contemporary societies and the legal systems 
that underwrite them. The war on terror is, therefore, akin to slow suicide, as 
societies attempting to protect themselves, in fact, destroy the defensive 
mechanisms that are supposed to guarantee their survival. ‘Repression – 
whether it be through the police, the military, or the economy – ends up 
producing and regenerating the very thing it seeks to disarm’ (Derrida, 2003: 
99). Radicalized combatants are, thus, doubly suicidal, as they incorporate two 
suicides in one: their own and the suicide of the radicalized democracies they 
fight. 
   In brief, the militarization of internal conflict and the transformation of 
domestic public spaces into war zones are accompanied by a parallel process 
occurring at the international level. Here, intolerance is expressed through illegal 
invasions, the use of prohibited techniques and practices, secretive homicide 
missions, and the transformation of international public spaces into global war 
markets.  
 
The nihilism of the excluded? 
 
An analysis of religious extremism imputed to Islam cannot neglect the 
background broadly depicted. In the West, the phenomenon has been examined 
as a corollary of social exclusion: extremists are said to come from the poorest 
and rundown parts of cities, where youth are raised in large housing estates and 
where trouble flares up periodically. Accounts illustrate the fractured lives of 
young second-generation migrants, their alienation, exclusion, family size, 
poverty and disrupted upbringings. Some traverse the pathways from home to 
care and from crime to prison, struggle within the education system, and display 
all the ‘predictors of criminal behaviour’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 337).  
   Radicalization of young people may be generated by individual psychological 
factors, but also by collective animosity against injustice and power. From the 
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area of psychology, for instance, research studies have focused on the processes 
leading to terrorism, conceptualizing the terrorist act as the final step on a 
narrowing staircase (Moghaddam, 2005). These processes are said to involve 
individuals who believe they have no voice in society, and in cases of suicidal 
terrorism to be encouraged by a ‘significance quest’ accompanied by various 
ideological reasons (Victoroff and Kruglanski et al, 2009). One of the causes 
identified in the literature is the feeling of ‘weakness, irrelevance, 
marginalization and subordination experienced by Muslim people’, combined 
with the memory of a glorious past of a great transnational civilization (Toscano, 
2016: 123). The ‘reactionary utopia’ of the Caliphate is explained in these terms, 
namely as the result of frustration determined by the gap between expectations 
and achievement. The frustration thesis seems to apply to both prevailing 
models of terrorism: ‘the fanatic who is outside any appeal to rationality, and the 
calculating actor who lacks any capacity for human empathy’ (McDonald, 2013: 
11). Authors advocating the ‘new terrorism’ model emphasize its pathological 
aspects, arguing that participants suffer from personality disorder and mental 
unbalance. On the other hand, terror has also been associated with the search for 
redemption, with protagonists neither ‘fanatic’ nor ‘calculating’, but just enacting 
redemptive violence that transforms and ‘saves’ at the same time (Weisbrod, 
2002).  
   Purely structural approaches to the issue, on the other hand, may be 
insufficient to explain the process: ‘It is erroneous to presume that material 
deprivation works in a simple and/or straightforward manner in relation to the 
propensity to commit violence’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2016: 338). True, 
radicalization takes place when a considerable cultural and relational distance, 
along with severe forms of inequality and injustice, exist between the parties 
involved. But to claim that inequality and social injustice are the main causes of 
terrorism neglects the fact that there is no terrorism in the fifty countries listed 
by the United Nations as the poorest, least developed, most unjust and unequal. 
As Sen (2015: 165) has argued,  
 
‘The simple thesis linking poverty with violence is empirically much too 
crude both because the linkage of poverty and crime is far from 
universally observed, and because there are other social factors… Calcutta 
is not only one of the poorest cities in India – and indeed in the world – it 
so happens that it also has a very low crime rate’ (ibid: 165).  
 
   In radicalized democracies, the young immigrants do not join terrorist 
networks out of existential vacuum or mere marginalization, but from 
resentment born of the humiliation suffered by people to which they feel close. 
While their parents chose where to live and partly maintained the culture of 
their country of origin, the young distanced themselves from that culture 
without acquiring a new one: ‘the danger that ruins life in the poor districts is 
not Islam or multiculturalism… it is deculturation’ (Todorov, 2014: 168). 
‘Deculturation’ is one of the characteristics of radicalized democracies, which are 
based on a winner-take-all logic whereby the losers are left with no place to 
occupy. Becoming extremist, in this situation, amounts to ‘pure and simple 
regression that offers a mixture of sacrificial and criminal heroism’ (Badiou, 
2016: 56). 
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    Scholars in the area of theology, however, have attempted to find in sacred 
texts the cause of contemporary terrorism. For example, charting the history of 
the Islamic State since its first incarnation in the seventh century, the following 
Hadith (a prophesy emanating from Muhammad) has been highlighted. Widely 
accepted among Sunni Islamists, the prophecy states that the history of the 
Umma (the Muslim international community) will go through five phases: first, 
the Prophet himself will rule; then Caliphs will rule according to the Prophet’s 
teachings; then force will be necessary for those teachings to spread; later, 
coercive rules will be established; finally, the time of caliphate will return and 
usher in the end of the world (Kennedy, 2016; Small, 2016). The Caliph, it should 
be specified, is not only the representative of the Prophet but also of God: he is 
God on earth (Adonis, 2016). Radical Islam, according to this reading, constantly 
recycles the remains of the past because it is in the past that its future is believed 
to lie. This notion of ‘frozen time’ finds ideal reception in traditional mindsets, 
characterized by ‘following’ rather than ‘questioning’: believers, in other words, 
are asked to simply repeat and reproduce the truths of revelation. Radical critics 
contend that, historically, Islam was founded on tribalism, anger for conquest 
and the power of money. It was imposed by force, therefore violence was its 
original major component.   
 
‘In the foundational text, those who disbelieve in the communications of 
Allah shall have a severe chastisement… We shall make them enter fire; so 
oft as their skins are thoroughly burned’ (ibid: 39).  
 
Prayers may solicit God to erase unbelievers from the earth, so that murder, 
inevitably, becomes sacred.  A certain reading of the Revelation conveys the 
notion that the Prophet of the Muslims is the ultimate prophet, that he speaks 
definitive truths, and that humans have nothing more to say or to add. In turn, 
‘God has nothing more to say or to add to what He has already formulated 
because He has said His last word to His last Prophet’ (ibid: 57).  
   Challenging causations derived from foundational texts, other scholars have 
underlined how the Quran is replete with suggestions around dialogue, peace 
and the development of harmonious interfaith relationships. There are many 
passages in the Quran, according to other authors, that destroy the idea, 
propagated by some, that non-Muslims are infidels and must be eliminated 
(Horkuc, 2009; Wills, 2016). Finally, the argument has been made that not Islam, 
but religion in general has always played a role in war and terrorist violence, 
even in advanced secular countries (Buc, 2015; Sacks, 2015; Hassner, 2016). 
International conflict in general is being ‘theologized’, as wars and military 
interventions, led by the Judeo-Christian West in the name of noble causes, are 
also, from a certain perspective, wars of religion (Derrida, 2002).   
   In his unceremonious analysis, Badiou’s (2016: 42) sees in contemporary 
terrorism ‘fascist armed gangs with a religious tinge’, arguing that religion has 
always provided a rhetorical cover for violent gangs: Franco’s thugs were 
blessed by priests, and even the mafia ‘professes a punctilious Catholicism’ (ibid: 
43). It could also be added that Blair’s warmongering was one of the outcomes of 
his conversion to Catholicism. Religion, death and sacrifice have often developed 
into the cult of martyrdom, and contemporary suicide bombers are just the latest 
example of this development originating from political or religious beliefs 
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(Barlow, 2016). On the other hand, joining terrorist networks, whether through 
religious belief or not, is the final stage of the construction of a nihilist 
subjectivity, prompted by the desire for revenge and destruction and coupled 
with subtle alienated imitation. Nihilist subjectivities, in Badiou’s view, 
incorporate a ‘desire for the West: the desire to possess, to share in what is 
represented, what is vaunted everywhere as the luxury of the West’ (ibid: 48-
49). 
    Revenge and destruction, however, are formalized through the mythology of 
tradition, as it is often the case in liberation struggles. The parallel may be 
illuminating. The history of anti-colonization gives several examples of how 
national struggles aim at liberating peoples from external oppressors as well as 
from the internal effects of that oppression. Traditional local elites in colonies 
were formed of individuals who mediated foreign rule, negotiated or 
accommodated demands, ‘making the best of a difficult and often humiliating 
relationship’ (Walzer, 2015: 2). These elites offering liberation were likely to be 
regarded with suspicion, and forced to accept nationalist claims. 
 
Even Gandhi was deeply opposed to many aspects of Hindu culture, 
especially the fate of the untouchables. He was assassinated by someone 
committed to a more literal, or more traditional, or perhaps more 
radically nationalist version of Hinduism’ (ibid: 4).  
 
   Liberation entails forms of traditionalism, and the achievement of 
independence may witness the growth of anti-modernization sentiments as a 
weapon against the oppressor. While Fanon (1965) was celebrating the birth of 
the ‘new Algerian’, fundamentalism was already beginning its political 
counterrevolution. Religion was used by leaders as a tool for their immediate 
purpose: creating political unity in the anticolonial struggle, but resentment 
brewed among groups of people who disliked ‘those secularizing and 
modernizing elites, with their foreign ideas, their patronizing attitudes, and their 
big projects’ (Walzer, 2015: 26). Real liberators, in sum, were expected to set 
past and future glory against present humiliation, and to display their ‘alterity’ 
from the enemy in the form of the martyrdom they were prepared to endure. 
The struggle, therefore, was not simply inspired by the desire of independence, 
but also by the necessity to destroy the ancient enemy, the members of alien 
faiths, the infidels.  
   The type of violence ascribed to radicalized Islam, however, contains some 
additional, original elements. 
 
Mimetic violence  
 
The formation of nihilist networks today, while pursuing the destruction of 
ancient enemies, aims at constructing commercial power: Isis sells petrol, gas 
supplies, artworks, cotton, arms, slaves, women (Badiou, 2016; Adonis, 2016).    
That all organizations, including non-state entities, engage in commercial 
initiatives should not be surprising in a world that preaches freedom of 
enterprise and the accumulation of profits. When organizations resort to acts of 
terror, however, we may presume they feel that they have no space left for 
peaceful interaction. For example, the invasion of a country may be followed by 
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resistance in the form of terrorist acts, while terrorist acts may determine 
responses of a terrorist (extra-legem) nature by states. Moreover, invasions may 
destabilize regimes and trigger sectarian violence. It is estimated, incidentally, 
that over thirty per cent of the founders of Isis are former members of the secret 
services of Iraq, who enact a form of revenge, responding to the invasion of their 
country with indiscriminate attacks (Lynch, 2015; Gerges, 2015).  This imitative 
dynamic leads us to other considerations. 
    If the context in which political violence is performed is itself violent, an 
escalating process allows the parties involved to devise increasingly violent 
practices. Such practices take on the nature of terrorism when violence becomes 
random and organizations using it adopt a concept of collective liability applied 
to the groups against which they fight. Targets are not precise actors whose 
conduct is deemed wrongful, but general populations defined by nationality, 
ethnicity, religious or political creed. Terrorism as ‘pure’ violence contains 
elements of what is known as hate crime, that is a perception that the victims are 
representatives of specific communities, and that they are not attacked in their 
capacity as individuals, but as individuals belonging to a real or imagined alien 
group. Both terrorism and anti-terrorism may choose ‘pure’ forms of violence, in 
an imitative process that rapidly becomes war-like (Witte, 1996; Black, 2004; 
Ruggiero, 2006). 
   Terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are linked in this causal chain that 
exhibits feud-like elements of vengeance, each side answering random violence 
with random violence. This causal chain is also detectable in the very structure 
that organizations are assuming. The radicalization of democracy, in other 
words, determines not only the proliferation and higher intensity of attacks, but 
also the organizational structure through which these are carried out.  
   Non-state violent organizations must, by definition, adopt clandestine 
structures, although the model with which they present themselves may vary 
according to contexts and in response to institutional action (Beck, 2015). In 
situations where popular support is widespread, terrorist groups may set up 
dual structures composed of an official, legitimate layer of activists and a hidden 
nucleus of combatants waging armed attacks. This dual structure seems to 
survive as far as terrorist organizations maintain strong links with social 
movements and perceive themselves as representatives of aggrieved groups 
(Combs, 2013; Martin, 2010). Lack of support from such groups who express 
their contentious politics through visible social movement activity often 
determines the collapse of terrorist groups (Ruggiero, 2010). On the other hand, 
repression of social movements, which characterizes radicalized democracies, 
weakens the tempering function such movements may exercise, leading to 
spiraling and senseless violence. 
   Radicalized Islamic groups have evolved over the last two decades following 
international events and the intensification of institutional responses. In the 
1990s, for instance, hard-core militants prevailed in organizations which 
displayed a high degree of professionalism and role differentiation. The distance 
between leaders and adherents was kept to a minimum, and all participants 
were tasked with specific operations that they were well able to carry out due to 
expertise and appropriate skills. Recruitment was selective and based, among 
other things, on proven ideological loyalty, military expertise, possession of 
resources, range of reliable followers, status and available key contacts. The 
 11 
prevailing model was, therefore, one that echoed the old international political 
organizations, with a central committee dictating the ‘line’, establishing the goals, 
identifying possible allies and drawing a short-term as well as a long-term 
strategy. The latter, of course, was the attainment of power, pursued through the 
building of strong links among participants, supporting social groups and their 
allies. 
   This structure, which hosts members operating according to the principles of 
‘authoritarian centralism’, was slowly supplemented by the creation of cellular 
units more or less coordinated among themselves and with increasingly weaker 
links with the central structure. The radicalization of democracy contributed to 
this evolution, as the ‘enemy’ was isolated and kept at increasing distance from 
civil society and its contentious expressions. The increase in social and relational 
distance from collective feelings and aggrieved groups forced organizations into 
the interstices of discontent, in an attempt to gather the ‘detritus’ left behind by 
social, cultural and political polarization. Violence is less destructive where the 
adversaries are closer in social space, a principle of which radicalized 
democracies may be aware but prefer to exploit with the aim of turning more or 
less defensible causes into delirious destruction. Radicalized democracies 
created drastic ruptures and imposed on its enemies a redefinition of themselves 
along with a radical reshaping of their strategy. This process is similar to that 
accompanying the criminalization of social movements, that leads in equal 
measure to some participants abandoning the fight and some choosing 
clandestine action. A scale shift was produced, whereby ascending violence was 
met with harsher exemplary punishments and spectacular retaliation. In 
response, violent groups launched yet higher levels of threats and deployed 
more spectacular violence (Tilly, 2004). 
     Attacks by scattered cells started to follow a ‘logic’ rather than an established 
‘programme’, with copycat action being conducted in contexts which were 
diverse and isolated from one another. Communication among terrorist cells, in 
brief, began to revolve around the symbolic nature of the destructive act, a form 
of signature indicating a common identity. Such terrorist cells, which are still 
operating now, are devoid of an international reach, but become international 
thanks to the images they furnish, the imagination they stimulate and the 
repetitions they encourage. ‘Violence increasingly seeks excess and rupture 
rather than organization and programme’ (McDonald, 2013: 168).  
   However, there is more than ‘excess and rupture’: when the choice of targets 
can no longer be justified by the specific social goal pursued, it is given a 
transcendental justification that can be termed historical. Some political conflicts 
emphasize history, while others emphasize humanity. The emphasis on history 
destroys all limits to human action, because history itself will be the supreme 
judge of the morality of that action (Camus, 1965). It should be noted that 
radicalized democracies mobilize the same sort of historical justification, as they 
too claim that the future will vindicate the legitimacy of their limitless and 
randomized violence (Ruggiero, 2006).  
    In the current phase, the development of ‘networks of cells’ seems to 
constitute the prevailing trend. The core structure, of course, remains and is now 
located in specific territories acquired by a military force, while peripheral 
entities are scattered and offer their support in a variety of fashions. Isis is said 
to adopt Mao’s revolutionary warfare strategy, based on the formation of an 
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irregular army. But while for Mao this army relied mainly on peasants, for Isis it 
avails itself of the expertise of jihadists from previous conflicts mixed with 
professional soldiers and intelligence personnel (Whiteside, 2016). Isis has 
conducted dozens of prison breaks, freeing thousands of veterans, while some 
20,000 inmates were released between 2008-2010 in rudderless countries 
afflicted by civil war. This constitutes, perhaps, a major pool of potential recruits, 
an army born of chaos held by those in command through a vertical apparatus 
and functional bureaus. This organizational form is copied largely from al Qaeda, 
is financially self-sufficient, media savvy, and kept together by a strong 
leadership.  
   At the same time, small groups of individuals may just plan and execute attacks 
which seem to be consistent with the strategy of the core organization, with or 
without the prior assent or a post-facto endorsement by the core organization. 
Recruitment may spread and attract also young women who are prepared to 
become spouses of combatants in the regions where the organization rules. New 
combatants may also be recruited from the large repository of aggrieved 
Muslims resident in most western countries, as we have seen.  In brief, it no 
longer seems that terrorism can be imputed to a single, however loosely, 
organized group. Along with hierarchical organizations, there are bands of 
followers who act outside formal structures and  
 
‘are motivated by feelings and beliefs widely shared among millions of 
Muslims worldwide…. The independence of the attacks in Madrid (2004), 
London (2005) and Mumbai (2008) from Al Qaeda control or direction is 
a vivid demonstration’ (Blum and Heymann, 2010: 162). 
 
  Radicalized democracies and the radicalized others activate their respective 
hidden networks and tools, the former choosing illegal forms of annihilation of 
the enemy, the latter mobilizing the fragmented groups and identities forced to a 
clandestine existence. Repression may push dissent underground, but may fail to 
destroy the informal networks and the social relationships through which  
identities are structured. Extreme repression, moreover, reduces the variety of 
points of reference for aggrieved groups, selecting the most extreme among 
them. This is when state agents can blend elements of warfare with those of  
criminal justice, thus responding to the radicalization they have created. 
Although at times radical violence may appear to be an unpredictable outburst 
or unexplainable explosion, it possesses a ‘geometrical precision’. It occurs when 
the social geometry of a conflict is violent. 
 
‘Every form of violence has its own structure, whether a beating 
structure, dueling structure, lynching structure, feuding structure, 
genocide structure – or terrorist structure. Structures kill and maim, not 
individuals or collectivities’ (Black, 2004: 15). 
 
Deliberative democracy and transgression 
 
It is time to identify some of the social forces that can temper the two types of 
radicalization discussed. 
 13 
   Does repression reduce radicalization by raising the cost of participation in 
violent action? A study investigating the effect of different types of repression 
found that closing off nonviolent avenues of dissent boosts group grievances and 
increases participation in violence. Targeting specific violent groups, on the 
other hand, proved to yield no discernible effect on violence. The study focused 
on ‘patterns of terrorism’ in 149 countries for the period 1981 to 2006 (Piazza, 
2017).  
   The argument presented so far is that as forms of government become 
increasingly elitist, and circles and networks of power grow impervious to 
external needs and demands, they are led to dismiss negotiation and resort to 
systematic, random repression.  Similarly, contentious politics becomes hidden, 
oblivious to deliberative interactions, and in its turn widens the range of its 
targets randomly. While the dangers posed by the radicalization of democracy 
have been briefly expounded, those posed by the radicalization of the other may 
materialize in atrocities which exceed those we have so far witnessed. This is 
because the types of networks being set up are based on weak links between 
central organizations and independent cells, so that violent acts become hard to 
control in terms of typology and intensity. This happens when affiliation is open, 
leaving to every component the opportunity to open up participation even more 
to allies and accomplices who are further and further removed from the core 
organization. Strong ties characterize limited affiliation, whereas the ‘strength of 
weak ties’ will cause a widening of the network and produce unpredictable 
human costs (Granovetter, 1973; 1982).  
   The revitalization of social movements could reverse this trend. It would raise 
the density of communication among individuals and groups, leading to the 
development of cosmopolitan identities (Della Porta, 2013). Most social 
movements are averse to organized violence, be this exercised by state or non-
state agents, and even when expressing themselves through ‘tumults’, as 
Machiavelli contended, they can bring social change, fight corruption and benefit 
democracy. To avoid unwarranted optimism, however, a short final discussion of 
deliberative democracy and its practices, mentioned above, is in order. 
    Advocates of this school of thought claim that political decisions should be the 
outcome of fair and reasonable discussion among citizens, who have the 
opportunity to exchange arguments and consider different views aimed at 
improving the public good. Conversation, therefore, is meant to establish actions 
and procedures, bring agreement on the decisions to make and, simultaneously, 
strengthen democracy through collective participation. The legitimacy of 
democratic political decisions rests on such collective participation, which 
includes ‘contained’ as well as ‘transgressive’ social movements (see above).  
Decisions, in their turn, are not the aggregate of competing pre-established 
interests, but the result of contrasting opinions formed through discussion. With 
respect to individual and collective decision-making, in sum, deliberative 
democracy shifts the emphasis from the outcome of the decision to the quality of 
the process leading to it. Discussion should be public and communication clear, 
as the early proponents of this model would stress (Rawls, 1972; Habermas, 
1984), and even if the process does not produce consensus, the remaining 
differences and the possibility of discussing them further will still enhance 
democracy.  
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   Looking critically at this theory, it could be contended that only skilled 
individuals and groups may be capable of making reasonable arguments and 
shape them in stylistically approved fashion.  Further, deliberation assumes that 
participants in a dialogue are rational, cooperative, and that their arguments are 
persuasive and unifying, a circumstance that may leave out the majority of 
citizens. Social biases and structural inequalities determine, after all, such skills. 
The deliberation model, moreover, leaves aside the role played by passions and 
collective forms of identification in the field of politics.  
    A more realistic model of deliberative democracy would posit conflict as a 
permanent feature of social systems and encourage constant mobilization, a 
never-ending process towards tolerance and equality. This type of  ‘agonistic 
pluralism’ (Mouffe, 2013) acknowledges that power is constitutive of social 
relations and that the political order is the expression of a specific hegemony. 
Agonistic pluralism forges identities in a precarious and always vulnerable 
terrain, as it takes place in ‘the political’, namely an arena that reflects the 
antagonism inherent in human relations. This type of deliberative democracy 
assumes not the existence of ‘enemies’, but ‘adversaries’, somebody whose ideas 
we combat but whose right to defend them we do not put into question (ibid).   
   Radicalized democracies strive to turn all dissent into the radicalized other,  
while dissent has an opposite goal, that of distancing itself from terror, including 
state terror. In this sense, states fighting the radicalization of the other should 
promote and, while doing so, encourage the revitalization and growth of social 
movements.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Recurring, and perhaps unfounded, complaints are heard that criminologists 
have shunned the analysis of terrorism (Ruggiero, 2006; Freilich and LaFree, 
2015). One should question, rather, whether criminological categories 
themselves are fungible for the issue at hand. This paper has proposed an 
analysis of political extremism that falls outside the canonical realm of 
criminology, starting with the simultaneous examination of the radicalization of 
democracy and the radicalization of the other. After highlighting the imitative 
dynamic that links institutional and anti-institutional violence, it has contended 
that the interaction between the two types of radicalization affects not only the 
intensity of the violence waged, but also the very structure of the two radicalized 
parties. The systematic repression of dissent, it has been argued, tends to turn all 
critical actors into terrorists, while social movements are likely to isolate the 
terrorist element within a society that they nevertheless combat. A specific form 
of deliberative democracy has been advocated, one that assumes the existence of 
conflict, inequality, injustice and, hence, antagonism while pursuing dialogue and 
conversation. 
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